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Introduction reduced appeal in a low-interest-rate 
environment, and (4) a tendency for 
early PV adopters to be wealthy, 
and not in need of financing. 
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As a result, a number of states have, 
in the past, set up special residential 
loan programs targeting the 
installation of renewable energy 
systems and/or energy efficiency 
improvements, and often featuring 









Historically, these loan programs 
have met with mixed success 
(particularly for PV), for a variety of 
reasons, including:  (1) historical 
lack of homeowner interest in PV, 
(2) lack of program awareness, (3) 
 
Download other clean energy 
fund case studies from: 
 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/cases/   
or Within this context, it has been 
interesting to note the recent flurry 
of announcements from several U.S 
cities concerning a new type of PV 
financing program.  Led by the City 
of Berkeley, California, these cities 
propose to offer their residents the 
 
www.cleanenergystates.org                                                  
1 Early examples of such programs are 
described in a previous case study in this 
series, titled “Renewable Energy Loan 
Programs” and available at: 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/RE_Loan_P
rograms.pdf
Case Studies of State Support for Renewable Energy                                                              February 2008 
of residential PV in their communities through 
this type of program is no doubt an interesting 
development.  Given, however, the potential for 
such programs to negatively interact with the 
residential solar ITC, it is important to evaluate 
the financial attractiveness of this specific type 
of loan program, particularly in advance of any 
broader state- or nation-wide “rollout.”  This 
case study presents such an evaluation. 
ability to finance the installation of a PV system 
using increased property tax assessments, rather 
than a more-traditional credit vehicle, to recover 
both system and administrative costs. 
 
As discussed in more detail later, this seemingly 
innovative approach has a number of features 
that should appeal to PV owners, including:  
long-term, fixed-cost, attractive financing; loans 
that are tied to the tax capacity of the property 
rather than to the owner’s credit standing; a 
repayment obligation that transfers along with 
the sale of the property; and a potential ability to 
deduct the repayment obligation from Federal 
taxable income, as part of the local property tax 
deduction. 
 
Because Berkeley appears to have the most-
well-developed proposal at the moment, this 
case study begins by describing Berkeley’s 
program, as currently planned, in more detail.  It 
then discusses subsidized energy financing and 
the potential negative tax implications of this 
type of program.  Next, taking Berkeley’s 
proposed program as a case study, it uses a 
simple pro forma financial model to first assess 
the potential financial benefit of the program 
relative to other commercially available 
financing options, and then to assess how much 
of that relative benefit might be eroded by the 
possible loss of the Federal ITC.  Finally, it 
concludes by discussing potential actions that 
cities contemplating this sort of program might 
take to clarify the issues and optimize the value 
provided to participating residents. 
 
For these reasons, Berkeley’s program – which 
was first announced on October 23, 2007 – has 
received considerable nationwide attention in 
both the trade and general press.  Since the 
announcement, cities from throughout California 
and the broader U.S. have expressed keen 
interest in the possibility of replicating this type 
of program.  In California alone, the cities of 
Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, and Palm Desert are 
all reportedly considering similar programs,2 
while the city of San Francisco has recently 
announced its own program, portions of which 
closely parallel Berkeley’s approach.
 
3 Berkeley’s Proposed PV Program   In 
addition, a bill (AB 811) that would authorize all 
cities (not just “charter cities” like Berkeley
 
4) in 
California to create this type of program was 
approved by the California General Assembly 
on January 29, 2008 and passed on to the State 
Senate for consideration.
As announced, the City of Berkeley would 
create a “Sustainable Energy Financing District” 
to enable its PV program.  This financing 
vehicle is modeled loosely on existing 
“underground utility districts” that enable the 
City to finance the burying of utility wires 
through increased property tax assessments.
5
 
That local governments from across California 
and the broader U.S. are so genuinely excited 
about the prospect of supporting the installation 
6  
Under the authority of this district, the City of 
Berkeley would facilitate the financing of 100% 
of the cost (after utilizing and accounting for up-
front rebates available through the California 
Solar Initiative, or CSI) of installing a PV 
system on the home of any participating 
resident.
                                                 
2 See http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/50580
3 See the December 11, 2007 press release at: 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/assessor_page.asp?id=72332
4 California cities are defined as either “general law” cities 
(which govern municipal affairs under the general laws of 
the state) or “charter” cities (which have adopted a home-
rule charter to govern municipal affairs).  Currently, only 
charter cities are eligible to offer this type of PV finance 
program, though AB 811 hopes to change this. 
7  Energy efficiency improvements, 




6 See Berkeley’s web page on its PV program at: 
http://www.cityofberkeley.info/mayor/GHG/solar.htm
7 Although 100% financing is the preferred offering, 
Berkeley is also considering allowing participants to make 
cash down-payments in response to the potential anti-
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property during the 20-year repayment 
period, then the new owner will pay the 
increased assessment over the remainder of 
that period.  Given that the payback period 
for a residential PV system likely exceeds 
the average duration of home ownership in 
the U.S., this approach ensures that a PV 
owner will not forfeit remaining PV value if 
s/he moves within the 20-year repayment 
period.
particularly those that are permanently tied to 
the property (e.g., furnaces, HVAC, insulation), 
will likely be added to the program in the future. 
 
As currently planned (the design of the program 
is still evolving), funding for the program would 
originate from local banks, which would either 
write checks directly to program participants, or 
alternatively channel the funds through the City 
to those participants.  Either way, participants 
would receive favorable terms from the banks, 
because of the aggregation function performed 
by the City (effectively allowing participants to 
borrow in bulk) as well as the relative security of 
the repayment obligation (discussed below).  
Early indications are that participants would be 
able to borrow at somewhere between 1.5% 




3) Because the loan is repaid through property 
taxes, the program is neither dependent on, 
nor does it impact, the homeowner’s credit. 
 
4) From the banks’ perspective, property tax 
payments are relatively secure:  in a 
default/foreclosure situation, the property 
tax tied to the PV system would be paid off 
prior to even the first mortgage on the 
property.  Specifically, the “cascade” of 
payments to creditors would proceed as 
follows:  ad valorem property taxes would 
be paid first, followed by special taxes and 
fees for services collected through property 
taxes (the PV tax would fall into this 
category), then first mortgages, and finally 
second mortgages and home equity loans.
8  With the Prime Rate at 
6% and the 10-year bond yield at 3.6% (both as 
of January 31, 2008), participants’ cost of funds 
would potentially be somewhere in the range of 
4.5% to 5.6%, fixed over a 20-year term.  These 
loan terms are generally more favorable – in 
both interest rate and maturity – than a 
homeowner would likely be able to obtain on its 
own outside of the program. 10 
  
5) For those taxpayers who itemize their 
deductions from Federal taxable income, 
there is – at first glance – a potential ability 
to deduct both the principal and interest 
payments as part of the deduction for local 
property taxes paid that appears as a line 
item on Schedule A of Form 1040.  If 
realized, this tax treatment would be even 
more advantageous than that afforded to 
mortgages and home equity loans, which 
feature tax-deductible interest, but not 
principal, payments. 
In return, participating residents would agree to 
repay the loan principal, plus interest and 
administrative expenses, through an increased 
property tax assessment lasting for a 20-year 
period.   
 
As described, Berkeley’s proposed program, and 
in particular the use of property tax assessments 
as a financing vehicle, has a number of attractive 
features: 
 
1) It offers the possibility of 100% financing at 
a fixed, favorable interest rate over a lengthy 
(i.e., 20-year) term. 
 
With respect to this last point, an initial analysis 
of tax law suggests that principal payments will 
not be deductible from Federal taxable income.  
In particular, the instructions for Schedule A, 
 
2) The increased property tax assessment is 
tied to the property, rather than to the 
current owner.  If the current owner sells the 
                                                                         
                                                 
double-dipping issue described in this case study.  This 
option is discussed in more detail in the concluding section. 
8 Personal communication with Cisco DeVries, the chief 
architect of Berkeley’s PV program, in December 2007 and 
January 2008. 
9 Though it remains to be seen whether (or how much) a 
program participant trying to sell such a property might 
need to discount the asking price to compensate for the 
higher assessment. 
10 Personal communication with Cisco DeVries, January 
2008. 
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and also IRS Publication 530, specifically note 
several items that may be included in property 
taxes but may not be deducted on Schedule A.  
These include itemized charges for services 
rendered to specific property (e.g., trash 
collection fees) as well as charges for local 
benefits that tend to increase the value of the 
property (e.g., an assessment to build a new 
sidewalk, or perhaps install a PV system).  IRS 
Publication 530 does, however, specifically state 
that one can “deduct assessments (or taxes) for 
local benefits if they are for maintenance, repair, 
or interest charges related to those benefits.” 
[emphasis added] 
 
Taken together, this guidance seems to suggest 
that principal repayments related to a PV system 
are not deductible from Federal taxable income 
on Schedule A, but the associated interest 
charges are deductible (if properly itemized as 
such on the property tax bill).  In other words, it 
appears that the tax treatment of this program 
would be as advantageous as that of mortgages 
and home equity loans, and certainly superior to 
that of consumer loans (which generally do not 
offer tax-deductible interest payments), but that 
additional tax advantages beyond those offered 
by mortgages and home equity loans are 
unlikely. 
 
Subsidized Energy Financing? 
 
One important concern related to this type of 
program is that the favorable interest rate may 
have unintended and undesirable consequences, 
if it jeopardizes the homeowner’s eligibility to 
receive the Federal solar ITC by triggering the 
anti-double-dipping provisions.  The remainder 
of this case study explores this particular issue in 
more detail through both a rudimentary review 
of tax law as well as a quantitative analysis of 
the financial impact of potentially losing the 
ITC. 
 
As mentioned earlier, EPAct 2005 established an 
investment tax credit (ITC) for residential solar 
installations.  The ITC, implemented as Section 
25D of the U.S. tax code, is equal to 30% of 
eligible costs, with a per-system cap of $2000.  
The credit was originally set to expire on 
December 31, 2007, but was subsequently 
extended for an additional year, through 2008.  
Efforts are currently underway to both modify 
and extend the credit.  
 
Section 25D(e)(9) of the U.S. tax code states, 
with respect to the tax basis of the project, that 
“For purposes of determining the amount of 
expenditures made by any individual with 
respect to any dwelling unit, there shall not be 
taken into account expenditures which are made 
from subsidized energy financing (as defined in 
section 48 (a)(4)(C)).”  In other words, the tax 
basis of the project to which the credit applies 
shall be reduced by the amount of any 
subsidized energy financing used to finance the 
system.11
 
Section 48(a)(4)(C), meanwhile, defines the 
term "subsidized energy financing" to mean 
"…financing provided under a Federal, State, or 
local program a principal purpose of which is to 
provide subsidized financing for projects 
designed to conserve or produce energy."  The 
instructions to IRS Form 6497 ("Information 
Return of Nontaxable Energy Grants or 
Subsidized Energy Financing") expand upon the 
Section 48 definition, noting that "Financing is 
subsidized if the terms of the financing provided 
to the recipient in connection with the program 
or used to raise funds for the program are more 
favorable than terms generally available 
commercially."  Moreover, "The source of the 
funds for a program is not a factor in 
determining whether the financing is 
subsidized." 
 
Taken together, this language seems to suggest 
that regardless of the source of the funds (i.e., 
whether Berkeley finances the program through 
local banks, or by tapping its bonding authority 
                                                 
11 The basis of the system will also be reduced by the 
amount of any non-taxable grants received by the system 
owner.  Because the California Solar Initiative (CSI) is 
administered by the state’s investor-owned utilities, it 
appears that grants or rebates for residential PV systems 
provided under the CSI qualify for an exclusion from 
taxation under Section 136 of the US Tax Code, which 
excludes “utility energy conservation subsidies” from gross 
income.  For more information, see an earlier case study in 
this series, titled “Exploring the Economic Value of EPAct 
2005's PV Tax Credits” and available at: 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/LBNL_59928.pdf. 
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Modeling Analysis or reserves, or by some other means), if 
Berkeley’s PV program enables a participant to 
access financing on terms that are "more 
favorable than terms generally available 
commercially," then Berkeley's program, which 
could be considered a "local program a principal 
purpose of which is to provide subsidized 
financing for projects designed to conserve or 
produce energy," will be considered subsidized 
energy financing.   
 
Taking Berkeley’s proposed PV program as a 
case study, this section uses a simple pro forma 
financial model to examine the potential 
financial value of the program relative to 
commercially available financing products, as 
well as the potential economic impact of the 
negative tax consequences described in the 
previous section.  Input assumptions to the 
model include the following:  
As mentioned earlier, indications from local 
banks suggest that Berkeley’s program might, in 
fact, provide participants with financing terms 
that are more favorable than are otherwise 
commercially available to such homeowners.  
This, in turn, suggests that the program might be 
considered to be subsidized energy financing, 
therefore reducing the value of the residential 
solar ITC.  Moreover, because Berkeley’s 
program intends to finance the full cost of the 
system (less any CSI rebates), the tax basis of 
the system would be reduced to zero, meaning 
that none of the credit’s value would remain.
 
• Installed costs of $10.75/W for a 1 kW 
system, $10/W for a 2 kW system, and 
$9.5/W for a 3 kW system.13  Different 
system sizes are modeled because the 
Federal ITC cap does not impact all system 
sizes equally.14 
• Annual system performance of 1350 
kWh/kW (which equates to a 15.4% 
capacity factor), degrading at a rate of 
0.5%/year (i.e., 10% over the 20-year loan 
period and assumed project life). 
• An expected performance-based buy-down 
(EPBB) amount of $2/W, below the $2.2/W 
currently available to the CSI reference 
system in PG&E’s service territory by an 
amount consistent with the annual 
performance described in the previous 
bullet.  The EPBB is assumed to be exempt 
from Federal taxation under the Section 136 
exclusion, and is also exempt from State 
taxation under State law. 
12   
 
This issue, however, should not be considered 
resolved:  subsidized energy financing is a 
complex topic, tax law is highly factual in 
nature, and the author of this case study is not a 
tax lawyer.  As such, qualified tax counsel 
should be consulted, though it is likely that only 
the IRS will be in a position to provide definitive 
guidance as to whether this type of program 
would be considered subsidized financing for 
the purposes of the solar ITC.   
• Annual O&M costs of 0.5% of installed cost 
per year, intended primarily to amortize the 
cost of one inverter replacement during the 
20-year loan period. 
 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, in order to 
illustrate the economic importance of this 
potential issue, this case study proceeds to 
quantitatively analyze the overall financial value 
of the proposed program, as well as the financial 
impact of potentially losing the ITC due to 
subsidized energy financing. 
• Avoided electricity costs starting at 
$0.15/kWh and escalating at a nominal 
3%/year.  No value is assumed for the 
project’s renewable energy credits (RECs). 
• Homeowner falls into the 28% Federal 
income tax bracket and 9.3% State income 
tax bracket.  State income taxes are 




                                                 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that total loss of the Federal ITC 
may not be an issue for some residents who lack adequate 
income tax liability to use the credit, regardless of the tax 
impact of Berkeley’s program. 
13 These installed cost assumptions stem from a December 
19, 2007 review of the CSI program statistics for residential 
systems.  Rated capacity is expressed in CEC-PTC terms.  
14 This issue is analyzed further in “Exploring the 
Economic Value of EPAct 2005's PV Tax Credits” (see 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/LBNL_59928.pdf). 
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The analysis is fairly straightforward, and begins 
by calculating the net present value of after-tax 
cash flows for a program participant under the 
“Berkeley Ideal” case – i.e., a scenario in which 
Berkeley’s program is not considered to be 
subsidized energy financing and participants are 
therefore able to access the full Federal ITC.  As 
the most-advantageous outcome, the “Berkeley 
Ideal” case (denoted by the x-axis at $0 in 
Figure 1) is the benchmark to which all 
subsequent scenarios are compared. 
• Per current law, the Federal residential ITC 
for solar stands at 30% of the project’s basis, 
capped at $2000.  Two other ITC scenarios 
are also modeled to reflect ongoing policy 
discussions surrounding the extension and 
potential modification of the credit:  (1) a 
$4000 cap, as was contained in a recent 
Federal energy bill, before the tax package 
was stripped out; and (2) no dollar cap at all.  
In all three cases, the credit is assumed to be 
captured at the end of the first year of the 
project, when income taxes are filed.  
The analysis then considers the relative 
economics of a PV system owner that does not 
participate in the program (a “non-participant”), 
and that instead uses one of the four competing 
commercially available financing alternatives 
described above:  the 20-year mortgage, the 15-
year home equity loan, the 10-year secured 
consumer loan, or the 5-year unsecured 
consumer loan.  Since these four financing 
alternatives do not negatively impact the Federal 
ITC, the after-tax economics of these scenarios 
relative to the “Berkeley Ideal” scenario depend 
solely on the relative attractiveness of the 
financing terms available, and the resulting 
comparison can be used to estimate the best-case 
financial value that can be obtained through a 
Berkeley-style PV finance program. 
• Berkeley borrowing costs of 5.0% over 20 
years, which is near the middle of the 4.5%-
5.6% likely range indicated earlier.  Interest 
payments levied and itemized via property 
tax bills are assumed to be deductible from 
both Federal and State taxable income, 
while principal payments are not deductible. 
• A nominal discount rate of 6.0% (i.e., equal 
to the Prime Rate as of January 31, 2008), 
intended to crudely reflect the homeowners’ 
opportunity cost of capital, and used only to 
calculate the net present value (NPV) of 
after-tax cash flows over the 20-year period, 
which will be used as the principal metric of 
comparison in this analysis. 
• Based on a January 31, 2008 review of 
current terms and lending rates from Wells 
Fargo (which has a strong presence in 
Berkeley), homeowner financing 
alternatives to the Berkeley program are 
assumed to include a 20-year mortgage 
refinance (at 5.5% fixed interest), a 15-year 
home equity loan (at 7.75% fixed interest), a 
10-year secured consumer loan (also at 
7.75% fixed interest), and a 5-year 
unsecured consumer loan (at 12.5% fixed 
interest).  Interest on the first two types of 
loans is Federal and State tax-deductible, 
while interest on the two consumer loans is 
not.  These loans are also assumed to be for 
100% of the outstanding project cost, after 
CSI rebate. 
 
As shown by the thin bars in Figure 1, the 20-
year mortgage is only slightly inferior to the 
“Berkeley Ideal” scenario, due to its slightly 
higher interest rate.  The 15-year home equity 
loan loses quite a bit more value:  roughly 
$1000, $2000, or $3000 for a 1, 2, or 3 kW 
system, respectively.  Although it carries the 
same interest rate as the home equity loan, the 
10-year secured consumer loan is considerably 
less-attractive, due its shorter term and lack of 
tax-deductible interest.  Finally, the 5-year 
unsecured consumer loan is the worst of all 
options for these same reasons, as well as its 
high interest rate.  Thus, if a home equity loan or 
consumer loan are the only viable financing 
alternatives – which is perhaps the most likely 
situation in a PV retrofit application (which may 
not warrant a full mortgage refinance) – then the 
Berkeley program potentially provides a 
substantial financial value to participants (at 
least under the “Berkeley Ideal” scenario, or 
• The analysis does not include consideration 
of any financing fees (e.g., closing costs) for 
the conventional loans or the administrative 
costs of the Berkeley program. 
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even a scenario where the residential ITC 
expires and is not renewed).  In addition, the 
program may offer other potential benefits not 
quantified here. 
 
Next, the analysis examines the after-tax 
economics of program participants if the 
Berkeley program is considered to be subsidized 
energy financing.  The wide bars in Figure 1 
illustrate the incremental impact (again, relative 
to the “Berkeley Ideal” case) of losing the ITC 
under the three different ITC dollar cap 
scenarios described above.  For program 
participants installing a 1, 2, or 3 kW PV 
system, losing the Federal ITC reduces the NPV 
of 20-year after-tax cash flows by almost $2,000 
under current law, relative to the “Berkeley 
Ideal” case (in other words, for each system size, 
the $2,000 cap is binding, and the loss is not 
exactly $2,000 due to one year of discounting).  
If the ITC cap is increased to $4,000 (as 
proposed in a recent Federal energy bill), then 
the loss increases to nearly $4,000 for the 2 and 
3 kW systems.  The 1 kW system, however, is 
not bound by the $4,000 cap, and so loses only 
about $600 of additional value (nearly $2,500 
total).  Finally, if the ITC dollar cap is 
eliminated altogether (as has also been discussed 
in policy circles), the 1 kW system is not 
incrementally impacted, the 2 kW system 
experiences additional moderate losses, and the 
3 kW system is severely compromised (by 


































Lost ITC (no $ cap)
Lost ITC ($4000 cap)
Lost ITC ($2000 cap)
5-yr consumer loan (unsecured)
10-yr consumer loan (secured)
15-yr home equity loan
20-yr mortgage
Figure 1.  NPV of After-Tax Cash Flows Relative to the “Berkeley Ideal” Case 
 
 
If one assumes that the “Berkeley Ideal” case is 
not attainable (i.e., that the ITC will be lost due 
to subsidized energy financing), then a 
comparison of the thin and wide bars in Figure 1 
shows that non-participants will always (for all 
three system sizes and all three ITC cap 
scenarios) do better financially than program 
participants if non-participants are able to access 
a 20-year mortgage at an interest rate within the 
range of that provided by the Berkeley program.  
A 15-year home equity loan is also superior for 
the 1 kW system under the $2,000 ITC cap, and 
for all three system sizes under a $4,000 ITC 
cap.  Finally, both the secured and unsecured 
consumer loans with non-deductible interest 
payments are inferior to the Berkeley program 
under all three ITC cap scenarios.   
 
In summary, if the Berkeley program does offset 
the full ITC, then this analysis suggests that it 
will not offer financial value beyond that offered 
by a home mortgage, but may still be 
competitive with a home equity loan (depending 
on the dollar size or existence of the ITC cap).  
The program’s primary beneficiaries, however, 
will likely be those residents who cannot access 
traditional home-backed forms of credit, and that 
otherwise might be inclined to use consumer 
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economics of the program for all participants, 
under all situations.  To this end, the following 
suggestions may help to clarify how best to 
proceed in order to maximize participant value. 
loans to finance their PV system (or those 
residents who cannot use the ITC anyway, due 
to insufficient income tax liability).  
Additionally, notwithstanding this financial 
analysis, some residents might benefit from the 
program’s other attractive features (e.g., loans 
not based on consumer credit, or loan repayment 
tied to property taxes rather than following the 
homeowner). 
 
1) Consider seeking formal IRS guidance.  
Although it is possible that Berkeley’s 
proposed PV program (and others that 
follow in its footsteps) would, as 
proposed, be considered a form of 
subsidized energy financing, tax law is 
complicated and highly factual in nature, 
and alternative arguments may persuade 
the IRS otherwise.  As such, cities 
pursuing this type of program should 
consider working with qualified counsel 
(and perhaps also together) to seek IRS 
guidance on this issue, prior to 
considering other alternatives. 
 
Discussion and Recommendations 
 
Taken together, the information presented in the 
text above and the modeling results shown in 
Figure 1 paint a picture of a new and innovative 
type of PV financing program that has many 
positive features, but that may nevertheless 
prove to be financially unattractive in some (but 
not all) situations due to potential negative 
interaction with the Federal ITC for residential 
solar installations. 
 
2) Consider allowing participants to 
provide a cash down-payment.  Cash 
down-payments would not be considered 
subsidized energy financing, and therefore 
would not impact the ITC.  With a $2,000 
ITC cap, a cash down-payment of 
$6,666.67 (i.e., $2,000/30%) would be 
sufficient to allow a participant to take the 
full $2,000 ITC.  At a $4,000 cap, the 
requisite down-payment increases to 
$13,333.33 (which may exceed the post-
rebate installed cost of smaller PV 
systems).  Although this strategy avoids 
the double-dipping issue, it presents other 
difficulties, such as the need for residents 
to provide up-front cash (and in some 
cases a large proportion of up-front cash, 
if the intent is to take the full ITC). 
 
Of course, as noted earlier, it is not certain that 
this type of program actually constitutes 
subsidized energy financing.  Even if it does 
qualify as such, it is possible that Congress 
could alter or even eliminate the anti-double-
dipping provisions in the future, making this 
issue moot.15  Finally, the possibility that the 
residential ITC will simply expire at the end of 
2008 without being renewed cannot be 
dismissed.  Under any of these three scenarios, 
the type of program described in this case study 
would be very attractive, as it would offer easily 
accessible and favorable long-term financing 
that transfers with the property and does not 
suffer any associated negative tax consequences. 
 
 Notwithstanding the above, however, there is 
certainly more than a passing chance that this 
type of program will be considered subsidized 
energy financing, and will therefore offset the 
ITC.  As such, it is prudent to examine ways to 
resolve or otherwise work around the issues 
discussed above, with the goal of improving the 
3) Consider more-advantageous sources of 
funding.  If working with local banks is 
going to be considered subsidized energy 
financing anyway, perhaps cities should 
explore other financing options in an 
attempt to maximize the “subsidy.”  For 
example, dipping into general or reserve 
funds might enable cities to offer program 
participants a lower cost of capital than 
that offered by local banks, with no 
additional negative tax consequences. 
                                                 
15 There is some precedent for this:  several years ago, 
Congress inserted language into Section 45 of the tax code 
limiting the maximum loss from double-dipping to 50% 
(down from 100%) of the full value of the production tax 
credit for wind power and other resources.   
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4) Consider guaranteeing the loan.  Past 
IRS guidance with respect to Section 48 
and subsidized energy financing has found 
that government-sponsored loan guarantee 
programs are not considered to be 
subsidized energy financing.  As such, 
adding a city guarantee of the loan might 
result in the same (and perhaps superior, 
through lower interest rates) benefits to 
participants as the currently proposed 
program, but without the negative ITC 
consequences.  Such a guarantee could 
potentially be layered right on top of the 
as-proposed program, continuing to utilize 
the property tax system as the repayment 
vehicle. 
 
If nothing else, this brief analysis should serve 
as the basis for further exploration of this 
important issue.  This is particularly true in light 
of the potential benefits offered by this type of 
program, the considerable amount of buzz that 
Berkeley’s proposed program has generated 
nationwide, and the numerous public 
expressions of interest in replicating it. 
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ABOUT THIS CASE STUDY SERIES 
 
A number of U.S. states have established clean energy funds to support renewable and clean forms of electricity 
production. This represents a new trend towards aggressive state support for clean energy, but few efforts have 
been made to report and share the early experiences of these funds.   
 
This paper is part of a series of clean energy fund case studies prepared by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory and the Clean Energy States Alliance.  The primary purpose of this case study series is to report on 
the innovative programs and administrative practices of state (and some international) clean energy funds, to 
highlight additional sources of information, and to identify contacts.  Our hope is that these case studies will be 
useful for clean energy funds and other stakeholders that are interested in learning about the pioneering 
renewable energy efforts of newly established clean energy funds.  To access or download all the case studies, 
see:  http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/ or http://www.cleanenergystates.org/
 
ABOUT THE CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 
 
The Clean Energy States Alliance (CESA) is a non-profit initiative funded by members and foundations to 
support the state clean energy funds.  CESA collects and disseminates information and analysis, conducts 
original research, and helps to coordinate activities of the state funds. The main purpose of CESA is to help 
states increase the quality and quantity of clean energy investments and to expand the clean energy market. The 
Clean Energy Group manages CESA, while Berkeley Lab provides CESA with analytic support. 
 
CONTACT THE MANAGERS OF THE CASE STUDY SERIES 
 
Ryan Wiser Mark Bolinger Lewis Milford 
Berkeley Lab Berkeley Lab Clean Energy Group 
1 Cyclotron Rd., MS90-4000 
Berkeley, CA 94720 
105 North Thetford Road 
Lyme, NH 03768 
50 State Street 
Montpelier, VT  05602 





Berkeley Lab’s contributions to this case study series are funded by the Clean Energy States Alliance, and by the 
U.S. Department of Energy (the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Solar Energy Technologies 
Program, as well as the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Permitting, Siting and Analysis) 
under Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231.  The Clean Energy Group's efforts in connection with this work and 
related activities are funded by the Clean Energy States Alliance, and by The Surdna Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund, the Oak Foundation, The John Merck Fund, The Emily Hall Tremaine Foundation, and The 




This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this 
document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency 
thereof, nor The Regents of the University of California, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, 
express or implied, or assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately 
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, 
trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the 
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect 
those of the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. 
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